I study a planner's choice of the level of property rights enforcement when heterogeneous agents can appropriate each other's resources. The planner cannot verify taxable incomes but can only inflict a cost on agents who are hiding resources from taxation. While this friction imposes a binding and effective constraint, the planner implements perfectly secure property rights. The planner's allocation incentivizes production through redistributive taxation and crowds out appropriation activities altogether by absorbing potential appropriators as personnel in enforcement. Being able to inflict higher costs on agents that misreport their taxable income allows the planner to implement outcomes with more redistributive taxation, fewer enforcement personnel, more productive activity, and higher welfare. The results emphasize the importance of frictions in the political arena for imperfectly secure property rights to prevail.
Introduction
The enforcement of rights to property requires the commitment of designated resources that a society looking to protect property rights has to collect from its members. In doing so, it faces the classic complication that those who benefit from secure rights to property don't want to contribute to establishing them. In this paper, I address the question what a planner can achieve when (s)he cannot verify the taxable income of those (s)he would like to tax in order to finance enforcement; and to what extent does the severity of this friction affect the planner's choice of a property rights regime?
Members of every society can use their potentially productive factors either in production activities or in appropriation activities. In the context of this paper, appropriation activities can be interpreted as corruption in the bureaucracy, a lobbied justice system, outright theft and property crimes, simple fraud, or extortion, expropriation by the government, as well as many other unproductive and purely redistributive activities. The availability of these appropriation activities makes it necessary to study the security of rights to property as an endogenously determined outcome. The security of property rights in turn critically affects the expected returns to all sorts of investments and therefore distorts individual investment decisions with implications for development and growth. 1 I analyze an environment in which heterogeneous agents can produce, appropriate others' resources, or work in enforcement. The first best outcome does see neither appropriation nor enforcement. Since appropriation is never attempted, property rights are perfectly secure.
I assume that the planner cannot verify the incomes of agents (s)he wants to tax but only inflict a cost on agents who are hiding resources from taxation. That is, agents can misreport their income in order to be subject to a different tax payment. But in order to do so, they have to hide some of their resources, which is costly. I show that, even though this technological friction binds and effectively constrains the planner's decision, (s)he still implements an outcome in which appropriation is absent and property rights are perfectly secure. Absent an inherent incentive for a planner to redistribute incomes across agents, (s)he achieves that using both costly enforcement and income redistribution. In fact, the planner may pay subsidies to encourage rather unproductive agents to abstain from appropriation activities 1 Many scholars have provided investigations into the importance of, broadly speaking, institutions for economic development and growth. Knack and Keefer (1995) and Barro (1996) find strong evidence that property rights institutions are of major importance in determining economic growth. Easterly and Levine (2003) report evidence that endowments affect long run economic outcomes through institutions only. Similar results are presented in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) . Rodrik et al. (2004) argue that institutions are the single most important determinant of development. On the more theoretical side, see, e.g., Murphy et al. (1993) , Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996) , and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) for effects of weak property rights economic decisions; Besley and Ghatak (2010) provide an overview. More generally, there is a large related literature on rent-seeking and appropriation. See, e.g., Hirshleifer (1988) and Skaperdas (1992) . and engage in production, thereby contributing to the pie available to society. In addition, (s)he uses the sector for enforcement to absorb all potential appropriators. Perfectly secure property rights are not too costly because enforcement personnel is recruited from a pool of agents that would otherwise engage in appropriation, not in productive activities. Similar to appropriation, employment in enforcement is an unproductive and redistributive activity financed out of the pie to which it does not contribute. However, it does not directly provide disincentives to engage in production. The ability to inflict a higher cost on agents that hide (or otherwise misreport) taxable income allows for more income redistribution, leading to a steeper tax schedule. The "marginal" tax payment, the tax paid by the least productive producer, is lower, and potentially a higher subsidy. The planner employs fewer personnel in enforcement and more agents produce more output increasing aggregate consumption and thus welfare.
In this environment, without political frictions, despite a realistic and important technological friction being present and binding, appropriation is absent. I analyze a variant of the model in which the decision maker maximizes an objective function that might arise from frictions in the political arena. In this case, the decision maker implements an outcome in which appropriation is present and property rights are not perfectly secure. So, these results lend support to the view that political economy frictions are at the heart of insecure rights
Exactly what determines how high a cost the planner could inflict on misreporting agents is likely a complicated question to answer. On the one hand, one can imagine a well developed country with a well governed tax authority; a well developed financial market in which participants have effective screening devices available and many companies are required to regularly report to and get audited by agents of other participants; with a relatively important heavy and manufacturing industry; and with relatively many big enough companies that require a well established organizational form with cross checks and a within-firm bureaucracy to function productively. On the other hand, one can also imagine a developing country with an understaffed tax authority and a large informal sector; with a relatively important agrarian sector; with large rural areas that are far behind the urban centers, both technologically and administratively; in which most firms are small enterprises, with a single owner often being the single employee. It seems that the cost that authorities can impose on agents that hide income should be higher in the former case because it would be more difficult to hide income and escape reporting duties when there are many well-organized structures for cross referencing reports.
The model is rather stylized as I don't take a stand on what appropriation is. 3 Therefore, this paper connects to several literatures. One example is the literature on crime started by Becker (1968) ; another example is the literature on corruption. For a positive analysis of the latter see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman (1975) ; for an analysis of its consequences see, e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) ; for an analysis of the optimal provision of incentives, see, e.g., Becker and Stigler (1974) ; for an overview, see, e.g., Aidt (2003) . Finally, this paper is related in spirit to Koeppl et al. (2014) who analyze the interaction of efficient enforcement of postproduction transfers with the dispersion of marginal productivities in a production economy.
The Model
The Underlying Economy Consider a static one period economy with a unit measure of agents and a single consumption good. Preferences are identical over agents and represented by the risk-neutral utility function u(c) = c. This assumption implies that there is no a priori incentive for a planner to redistribute. Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity w ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that w is drawn from a publicly known distribution with cumulative distribution function F (w), differentiable density f (w) on the support [0, 1], and mean µ. Without loss of generality, order agents in [0, 1] according to their productivity. Finally, agents are endowed with one unit of time that is supplied indivisibly to an occupation in one of three sectors that are mutually exclusive. An agent with productivity w ∈ [0, 1] can decide to either produce w units of the consumption good, work in an enforcement sector for a fixed and certain wage w e , or engage in appropriation activities. Let Ω p , Ω a , and Ω e be the sets of producers, appropriators, and enforcers with measures ω p , ω a , and ω e , respectively. These are equilibrium objects. Producers pay a tax t w ∈ [−1, 1] that is indexed by and may vary with their productivity. After production and tax payments but before consumption, there are two rounds of random matching between agents. In the first round, every agent can meet either an appropriator, a producer, or an enforcer and appropriation takes place. In the second round, successful appropriators, while fleeing the scene are randomly matched with (i.e., run into) another agent and may be apprehended if they happen to run into an enforcer.
Enforcement personnel is clearly recognizable, cannot be expropriated of their resources (they enforce their own property rights perfectly), and cannot apprehend agents that did not violate anybody else's property rights. I assume that the probability p of any agent meeting an appropriator equals the measure of appropriators, ω a , the probability q of any agent meeting a producer equals the measure of producers, ω p , and the probability (1 − θ) of any agent meeting an enforcer equals the measure of enforcers, ω e . 4 If a producer with productivity w is matched with an appropriator in the first round, (s)he loses all his or her resources w − t w to the appropriator. If (s)he meets another producer or an enforcer, then they just chat and walk off. On the other hand, if an appropriator meets a producer with productivity w, (s)he runs off with the resources w − t w the producer carried. If (s)he meets another appropriator, then there is nothing to appropriate and both walk off empty-handed. If (s)he meets an enforcer, then (s)he recognizes that and realizes that there is again nothing for him or her to appropriate and so (s)he does not try; the enforcer cannot apprehend a potential offender that did not get to commit an offense, so, both walk off. If enforcers meet they chat and walk off. In the second round, successful appropriators have their hands full of resources and cannot appropriate anything more if they were to run into another producer or another successful appropriator carrying resources. Unsuccessful appropriators cannot expropriate successful appropriators on the run. Producers, expropriated or not, cannot apprehend an appropriator on the run.
However, if a successful appropriator meets an enforcer, the appropriator loses all the resources (s)he carries and the enforcer returns them to the producer who was expropriated of them.
The apprehended appropriator does not incur any additional costs besides zero consumption.
Finally, all agents consume their resources.
The Planner There is a benevolent planner that maximizes aggregate welfare. (S)he instructs all agents what their occupation is, collects taxes from producers, and pays enforcement personnel in order to maximize the sum of all agents' expected payoffs. 5 (S)he has to maintain a balanced budget, i.e., the expenses for enforcement personnel have to equal the taxes collected: ω e w e = w∈Ω p t w f (w)dw. 6 Moreover, the planner does not have any information about a specific producer's productivity and cannot verify what a producer's output, i.e., his or her income is. The planner can only inflict a cost φ ∈ [0, 1] per unit of output an agent hides from taxation.
Information An agent's productivity is his or her private information. After production, agents show their income (i.e., the output of their productive activity) to the planner and pay the tax that (s)he designates for agents with that income to pay. Agents can misreport their income in order to be subject to a different tax payment by showing the planner fewer resources than they actually own. When doing so, they have to hide the resources they don't show to the planner-at a cost φ ∈ [0, 1] per unit of income hidden. I assume, however, that 4 These matching probabilities arise as a special case of a more general matching technology, leaving the qualitative properties unaltered.
5 The planner's choice of what measure of enforcement personnel to employ amounts to choosing (a level of investment into) the apprehension technology, which determines the probability of apprehension (see, e.g., Imrohoroglu et al. (2000) ).
6 While budget balance would arise anyway, imposing it simplifies the analysis. it is impossible to hide all output produced. 7 I further assume that agents cannot pretend to have produced more than they actually have. Allowing agents to do that would add three additional incentive compatibility constraints. However, at the solution of the planner's problem as it is, no agent would ever want to do so, even if it were costless. The analysis would thus be unaffected. 8
Timing The exact timing in the economy is summarized in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 depicts the timing in the underlying economy as described above. Table 2 gives the larger picture.
In the beginning of the period, the planner chooses and implements a regime of taxes and enforcement and announces his or her instructions for all agents. Thereafter, given the prevailing regime and the planner's instructions, agents engage in activities of their choice. Producers produce and pay taxes. Then, agents are randomly matched and interact with each other.
Here, appropriators try to appropriate resources from producers. Finally, agents consume.
I make two technical assumptions on the distribution.
These assumptions are sufficient but not necessary for all the proofs to go through. They do not seem to be particularly restrictive. As a simple example, the uniform distribution complies with them. Assumption 1.1 is purely technical and has no obvious economic interpretation attached to it. Assumption 1.2 implies that, in any allocation implemented by the planner, at 7 Conceptually, it is not a problem to allow that but it unnecessarily complicates the analysis. 8 The important additional incentive compatibility constraint would simplify to
At the solution of the current incentive problem, this constraint is satisfied. It then follows that, intermediated by some of the present constraints, the other two additional incentive compatibility constraints are also satisfied.
Regime choice

Occupations
Meetings and interaction The planner chooses and Given the regime, agents Agents are randomly implements a regime and (follow instructions and) matched and interact. instructs all agents. choose occupations. Then, they consume. least 10% of all agents that could produce, do produce. 9 I make this assumption to simplify a uniqueness argument. However, the condition it helps to satisfy is never violated in any solution anyway, independent of this assumption on the distribution. In appendix B, I lay out an example economy with a uniform productivity distribution. I use it to depict a few results below.
Analysis
I start by specifying the actions agents in the underlying economy can take and the payoff functions these map into as well as the describing the planner's objective function. After that I state and discuss the implications of the model. I take the economic fundamentals summarized by the distribution function F for productivities and the technology characterized by the cost parameter φ as given. All proofs can be found in appendix C. 
Payoffs and the Planner's Objective Function
and χ e (w) = χ e w . Let p and q be the probabilities of meeting an appropriator and a producer, respectively. A producer meets an appropriator with probability p, in which case (s)he is expropriated of all his or her resources. With probability 1 − θ an enforcer apprehends the appropriator and returns the producer's resources to him or her; with probability θ, the appropriator can run off with them. Therefore, an agent w's expected payoff from production is given by
An appropriator who is matched with a producer gets a payoff proportional to a draw from the set of productivities of producers net of taxes. That is, given σ, conditional on being matched with a producer (s)he can expect to run of with resources that, if not appre-hended, give him or her expected utility according to the the function v :
is the same for all appropriators as it is independent of the appropriator's productivity. When running off with the resources appropriated, (s)he meets an enforcer and is apprehended with probability 1 − θ, in which case (s)he consumes nothing; (s)he gets away with probability θ. Therefore, agent w's expected payoff from being an appropriator is given by θqv(σ)
An agent with productivity w that works in the enforcement sector receives a wage w e for sure and his or her payoff from working in enforcement is thus u[w e ] = w e .
The planner takes into account the map from agents' occupational choices to the probabilities and understands that q = ω p , (1 − θ) = ω e , and p = ω a , where
and
Agent w's expected payoff from being a producer is given by the functionφ :
The planner's balanced budget can be written as
The planner's objective function is given by 10
10 The left hand side equals
I first study the efficient outcome if the planner is unconstrained and can dictate occupational
choices. Then, I analyze the case of a constrained planner that cannot control agents' occupational choices. Thereafter, I analyze the case in which incomes are unverifiable and producers can incur a cost to report a different income so as to be subject to a different tax payment.
The First Best Outcome
Consider the following two optimization problems. First, suppose the planner is unconstrained so that (s)he can not only choose a tax schedule, the employment in enforcement, and the wage paid in the enforcement sector but also instruct agents what occupation to take up, irrespective of whether or not they find it optimal to do so. The planner's problem is
The constraint is basically capturing feasibility of the regime. Second, assume that the planner cannot control individual occupational choices but only the regime consisting of employment in enforcement, the wage paid in enforcement, and the tax schedule. The planner's instructions thus have to be incentive compatible. The problem (s)he faces is given by
The last three constraints capture the incentive problem the planner faces. Each agent should expect a payoff from the occupation (s)he is instructed to take up that is at least as high as the maximum payoff (s)he could obtain from either one of the alternative occupations.
The following result states that the solutions to both problem (PP1) and problem (PP2) implement the first best outcome. 11
Proposition 1 (First best outcome). This first best outcome derives from two aspects. Consider the unconstrained planner who faces problem (PP1). First, both appropriation and enforcement are purely redistributive.
Any agent that appropriates (or enforces) does not produce and thus not contribute to the pie the planner has available for distribution. Second, linear utility implies that the unconstrained planner does not have an a priori incentive to redistribute resources among agents through transfers. As a consequence, the planner just maximizes output so that everybody produces and any tax schedule that only redistributes incomes through tax payments and subsidies is efficient. In particular, collecting no taxes (and thus not paying any transfers) at all is an optimum. Notice that, while enforcement is costly due to foregone production by personnel employed in enforcement, the resources spent on it are consumed by enforcement personnel and thus enter the planner's objective.
Next, consider the planner whose occupation assignments have to be individually optimal given the regime chosen so that (s)he faces problem (PP2). (S)he also instructs all agent's to produce so as to maximize the pie. (S)he then collects taxes and subsidizes unproductive agents with transfers paid for by productive agents. The transfers equalize consumption across agents so as to incentivize abstention from appropriation. No resources are spent on enforcement at all. The intuition is exactly the same as before. Appropriation and enforcement (and enforcement personnel) don't contribute to the pie. Hence, as long as subsidies to potential appropriators can make the efficient outcome incentive compatible, there will be no enforcement and everybody produces so as to maximize the pie available for consumption in society.
Unverifiable Incomes
In this section I allow producers to misreport their income in order to be subject to a different tax payment. The planner cannot verify the income an agent reports. In order to misreport their incomes, agents have to incur a cost φ ∈ [0, 1] per unit of resources they are hiding from taxation. The planner's problem is
for a.e. w ∈ Ω p , for a.e. w ∈ Ω p , w > w ,
for a.e. w ∈ Ω e , for a.e. w ∈ Ω p , w > w ,
for a.e. w ∈ Ω a , for a.e. w ∈ Ω p , w > w ,
Constraints (p1), (e1), and (a1) state that an agent in the respective occupation should expect at least as high a payoff as (s)he could expect from either one of the other two occupations.
Constraints (p2), (e2), and (a2) state that no agent w, independent of what occupation (s)he is assigned, should be willing to produce, misreport his or her income to be w < w, and incur both the associated tax payment t w and the cost from hiding output (w − w ). In particular, the right hand side of these constraints captures the expected payoff from producing and hiding some output. Constraint (p2) therefore implies that, whenever θp < 1, for all w, w ∈ Ω p , w ≥ w ,
If φ = 1, the planner can implement the first best outcome with a small enough announced wage in enforcement, e.g., w e = 0. I thus focus on the interesting case when φ ∈ [0, 1).
Constraint (bbc) is the budget balance constraint. Constraint (coc) requires the occupational choices to be consistent so that the measures of agents in all occupations are nonnegative and add up to one. Finally, the equalities collected in constraint (prob) state that the planner understands and takes into account how the occupation assignments (s)he makes map into the probabilities that enter the expected payoffs. The following result characterizes the solution to problem (PP). This result says a number of things. The planner chooses to employ enough enforcement personnel so as to crowd out appropriation altogether and property rights are perfectly secure.
Proposition 2 (Unverifiable incomes). Given a cost of misreporting
(S)he does so not by deterrence or punishment but by absorbing potential appropriators into the sector for enforcement. That is, unproductive agents are employed in enforcement at a fixed wage. Appropriation will never be attempted so that enforcement personnel does not actually provide a service other than being present (and thus effectively deterring appropriation efforts). Being employed in enforcement amounts to refraining from appropriation. The wage paid in enforcement amounts to a transfer financed by productive agents.
The intuition is that productive agents prefer to pay a tax for sure so as to, in return, face less uncertainty about whether or not they might fall victim to expropriation after production. While taxes may distort the occupational choice between production and appropriation, higher tax payments induce a first order decrease in the expected payoffs from both production and appropriation. This effect is present in general, independent of the exact tax schedule in place. So, tax payments affect the choice between either one of those two occupations and employment in enforcement. Too high taxes may draw productive agents (as well as appropriators) into the enforcement sector. The threat of expropriation of the resources an agent carries around, however, affects the occupational choice between production and appropriation; as does the probability of getting apprehended, albeit in the opposite direction. Through the sector for enforcement, as a second order effect, tax payments increase the probability of productive agents being able to reap the returns to their productive activity. This effect increases the incentive to produce. At the same time this second order effect decreases the probability of appropriation efforts being successful. It thus decreases the incentive to engage in appropriation activities. Therefore, at the margin, this effect induces more agents to prefer to produce. Inframarginally, agents lean more towards switching to an occupation in the enforcement sector. Thus, the planner optimally employs rather unproductive members of society as enforcement personnel at a wage that makes them indifferent between enforcement and appropriation. As (s)he absorbs all potential appropriators into the enforcement sector, there is no appropriation and property rights are perfectly secure. This security of property rights derives from the availability of a sector for enforcement of those rights because it provides an alternative occupation. That occupation is unproductive, as is appropriation.
But, in contrast to appropriation, it does not harm the incentives of rather productive agents to actually produce. Perfectly secure property rights are not too costly because enforcement personnel is recruited from a pool of agents that would otherwise engage in appropriation.
Enforcement does not withdraw agents from productive activities.
The tax profile that finances enforcement is redistributive. High income agents pay higher taxes than-and may even finance transfers to-low income agents. In fact, the "marginal" tax, the tax paid by the least productive producer, may well be negative if the cost of misreporting incomes is high enough. Negative taxes for unskilled producers subsidize their production, which contributes to the pie society has available for distribution amongst its members. These subsidies also incentivize abstention from appropriation, which would hurt others' incentives to produce. As an example, figure 1(a) depicts the marginal tax as a function of the cost of misreporting for an economy in which the productivity distribution is uniform. It is negative for (not particularly) high costs of misreporting.
In societies that are able to inflict higher costs on agents that misreport incomes it is easier to implement more redistributive tax profiles. That is, the tax profile can be steeper and the marginal tax can be lower-and subsidies can be higher. Figure 1 (b) depicts the tax profiles for a few selected values of the cost parameter φ and compares them to the first best tax schedule. The flat part at low productivities is due to the assumption that all agents that don't produce were to face the marginal tax if they produced. It however helps to visualize the productivity cutoff and thus where the tax profile starts effectively. All tax profiles are increasing and higher costs of misreporting imply steeper profiles with more tax payers (or subsidy receivers), i.e., more productive agents, and a lower marginal tax payment. None of them is as steep as the first best profile. The constraint implied by the friction in tax collection is binding and effective.
Such a steeper tax profile encourages some agents to produce that would try to appropriate or work in enforcement if the tax profile were to implement less income redistribution. As a consequence, fewer agents work in enforcement and more agents produce. Thus, more output is produced and available to share among the members of society, which increases welfare.
Since aggregate consumption increases, agents employed in enforcement get their share of that increase so that their wage is higher. Figure 2 The friction in the tax collection technology induces a binding and effective constraint on the planner's decision. Yet, the planner implements an outcome with perfectly secure property rights and no appropriation ever attempted. This result hints at the need for frictions in the political arena affecting the decision maker's objective function to generate insecure rights to property.
A Political Economy Friction
In this section, I ignore the technological friction studied so far. Instead, I provide an example of an optimization problem that could be arising from a friction in the political arena. The decision maker's objective function differs from the one the planner maximizes. The resulting solution to the optimization problem allows for appropriation to take place. A very simple example would be to consider a situation in which the political class favors appropriators. One can think of a corrupt bureaucracy that favors corrupt bureaucrats. Clearly, the implemented regime will allow for appropriation to occur and be profitable in equilibrium. Since this case is not very interesting, I focus on another one. Suppose that the decision maker can reap a rent from his or her position. (S)he can collect taxes, use some of the receipts to pay for enforcement personnel, and keep the rest. (S)he is basically a dictator. For this economy to allow for a meaningful outcome, I assume that producers can "go informal" and retain a fixed amount α ∈ (0, µ) of resources, independent of his or her productivity. 12 I assume that
wherew = w * (0) < 1 solvesh(w) = 0 andh is defined as in equation (1). These retained resources can, however, be appropriated by other agents. That is, if the decision maker asks too high tax payments from an agent (s)he might choose to hide all his or her output. Since α < µ, the additional constraint is not binding in problems (PP1) and (PP2), so that adding it does not alter the first best solution. The assumption captured in equation (3) implies that adding this additional constraint does not alter the solution to problem (PP). The tax schedule the planner implements satisfies w − t w > w * − t w * ≥ α for all w > w * and for all φ ∈ [0, 1). Consider the optimization problem
The objective is to maximize the residual of the tax receipts minus the cost incurred by paying for employment in enforcement. Compared to problem (PP2), the decision maker ignores the budget balance constraint. The other constraints are the same as in problem (PP2) except for the additional option of producing, hiding all the output, and retaining only α. They require that (almost) all agents are at least as well off in the occupation they have been assigned as they would be in any other occupation. Additionally, a producer's after tax income should be at least as high as α and enforcers and appropriators should not prefer to produce and retain
α. The following result shows that this decision maker allows for appropriation to be present. The reason is that enforcement is costly. (S)he prefers to consume the resources extracted from producers rather than spending them on enforcement. This result indicates that, since appropriation is feasible, one can certainly find an objective function that induces a society's decision making process to deliver outcomes with imperfectly secure property rights. Frictions in the political arena are major candidates for playing a leading role in that respect.
Proposition 3 (Political economy friction). The decision maker chooses a regime so that all agents with productivity w ≥ α produce and pay taxes t w = w − α. (S)he does not hire any enforcement personnel so that
Conclusion
I studied a model of appropriation and endogenous enforcement of property rights. I analyzed what a planner can achieve when (s)he is unable to verify taxable incomes. I showed that, although this friction induces a binding and effective constraint on the planner's decision, it does not prevent him or her from implementing perfectly secure property rights. In order to so, the planner uses a mix of redistributive taxation and employment of potential appropriators in enforcement. It seems that frictions in the political arena that shape the objective function in society's decision making process are important in generating imperfectly secure rights to property. Such frictions likely derive from strategic interactions of competing social groups with conflicting interests. Thus, in order to understand the lack of secure property rights and its implications for economic development, we need to understand these strategic interactions between competing groups in society.
A The First Best Outcome for more General Utility Functions
In this section I briefly discuss a generalization of proposition 1. 
and enforcement personnel receives a payoff u[w e ] where the budget balance constraint (1 − θ)w e = 1 0 χ p w t w f (w)dw has to be observed. The planner's objective function is
The incentive compatibility constraints change in the obvious way. It can be verified that the unique solution to both problem (PP1) and (PP2) with the above alterations is χ p w = 1 and t w = w − µ for a.e. w ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that θ = 1, 
B An Example Economy
In this section I briefly provide the model outcome for an example economy. For simplicity, I
assume F is the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. It satisfies assumption 1.
Claim 1. The uniform distribution complies with assumption 1.
Proof. For the first part, with the uniform distribution, letting g : [0, 1] → R, the expression becomes,
which satisfies g(0) = 1 2 , g(1) = 0, and g (ŵ) =ŵ − 1 < 0 for allŵ ∈ (0, 1). That is, g(ŵ) ≥ 0 for allŵ ∈ [0, 1]. For the second part, algebra reveals that F (w) =w < 1 2 .
Q.E.D.
Fix φ ∈ (0, 1). Given that F (w * ) = w * = 1 − θ, the equilibrium requirement h(w * , θ; φ) = 0 can be written
Since the right hand side is a strictly decreasing function of θ approaching ∞ with θ → 0 and 0 with θ → 1, for each φ ∈ (0, 1), there is a unique θ * that implies equality. Then, all other relevant variables follow:
For comparison, the first best tax schedule is t f b
C Proofs
In this section, I collect the proofs of the results in the text. It is organized in the same way as the analysis in section 3.
C.1 The First Best Outcome
Proposition 1
Proof. Consider problem (PP1). The objective function is always less than or equal to µ and equals µ if and only if χ wf (w)dw = µ so that the incentive compatibility constraint is violated for a positive measure of agents, a contradiction.
C.2 Unverifiable Incomes
Proposition 2 I prove proposition 2 by a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 1.
In any solution to problem (PP), there is a positive measure of producers.
Proof. Consider any solution to problem (PP) and suppose for a contradiction that ω p = 0. Then, total output (i.e., the objective), the total taxes collected, w, and the payoff of an appropriator are all equal to zero. There exists a w * ∈ (0, 1) and a t ∈ (0, 1) such thatΩ p = [w * , 1] and tw = t for all w ∈Ω p satisfy
To see this, notice that the equalities in this expression imply that t = F (w * )w * . That is, plugging in and rewriting, for the strict inequality to hold, we need to require that w
Since the limit of the left hand side with w * → 1 is 1 > 0, the claim follows by continuity. Let thê
, the producers payoff is w − t ≥ w * − t for all w ∈Ω p , all agents in enforcement receive w e , nobody wants to switch to appropriation since the payoff associated with it (the right hand side of the strict inequality) is dominated, and all producers and enforcers (weakly) prefer their occupation over the other one. Finally, t satisfies constraints (p2), (e2), and (a2). This allocation is in the constraint set and increases output and thus the objective function above zero, which establishes a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. In any solution to problem (PP), there exists a w
Proof. Consider any solution to problem (PP) and suppose for a contradiction that there are sets W and W with positive measures, such that W ⊆ Ω p , W ∩ Ω p = ∅, and w > w for all w ∈ W and w ∈ W . That is, for all w ∈ W and all w ∈ W ,
which violates either constraint (e2) or (a2) or both, establishing a contradiction. Since, by lemma 1, ω p > 0, it follows that w * < 1. Q.E.D.
From now on, I adopt a more convenient notation that appreciates the fact that all agents at least as productive as w * produce. Since ω p = (1 − F (w * )) and both ω e ≥ 0 and ω a ≥ 0 it directly follows that ω e = (1 − θ) ≤ F (w * ).
Lemma 3. In any solution to problem (PP), there is a positive measure of enforcers.
Proof. Consider any solution to problem (PP) and suppose for a contradiction that ω e = 0. Then, θ = 1, and since, by lemma 2, Ω p = [w * , 1] for some w * ∈ [0, 1), it has to be the case that p = F (w * ) < 1 and (1 − θ)
There exists an > 0 such that the tax scheduletw = tw + for all w ∈ Ω p satisfies
There now exists a δ > 0, such that
Finally, there now exists a γ > 0 such thattw =tw − γ for all w ∈Ω p satisfies 
There exists an > 0 such that the tax scheduletw = tw + .
Then, there is a δ > 0 such that 
Lemma 5. In any solution to problem
Proof. Consider any solution to problem (PP).
Since
, and, by lemma 4, (1 − θp)(w
Now, there is a γ > 0 such that 
where the second to last equality is due to lemma 5 and p = F (w * ) − (1 − θ). Suppose that ω a = 0. There exists an 2 > 0 such that the tax scheduletw =tw + 2 for all w ∈ Ω p satisfies
There now exists an δ > 0, such that
There now exists an 3 > 0 such thattw =tw − 3 for all w ∈Ω p satisfies
(1 −θp)(ŵ * −t w * ) > (1 −θ) 
Notice that each σ ∈ Σ corresponds to some σ ∈ Σ. To see this, just note that the cutoff w * implies that χ p w = 1 for all w ≥ w * and zero otherwise. The following result obtains. Proof. Observe that problem (PP ) is the very problem (PP), constrained to a subset of the original constraint set, and the notation adjusted to that subset. Lemmas 1 to 6 (and the corresponding proofs) establish that for all elements of the constraint set of (PP) excluding the constraint set of (PP ), there is an element in the latter dominating it. A solution to problem (PP) that is not a solution to problem (PP ) would thus be dominated by some element of the constraint set of problem (PP ), a contradiction. If problem (PP ) has a solution, then it dominates all other elements of the constraint set of (PP ) while each element of the constraint set of (PP) is dominated by some element of the constraint set of (PP ). It thus dominates all elements of the constraint set of (PP). Lemma 1 together with lemma 2 establishes that w * < 1; lemma 3 establishes that ω e = (1 − θ) > 0 so that θ < 1. Finally, since the φw − tw = φw * − t w * for all w ∈ Ω p , we have that tw = (t w * − φw * ) + φw, which is a linear, increasing function of w if φ > 0 and constant in w if φ = 0. Q.E.D.
I can now prove proposition 2.
Proof. Consider problem (PP ) and in particular the constraint set. Combining equations (6) and (7), since θ < 1, the tax receipts collected are (5) and (6) (1 + θ(1 − θ))(1 − (F (w * ) − (1 − θ))θ) . (13) 
